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Review of Dry Bulk Shipping Market 
Ms Fang Zhang, CY Tung International Centre for Maritime Studies 
 
The CONSTANTLY CHANGING Dry Bulk Market  
 
The growing global economy leads to increasing demand for commodities and raw materials. 
The Baltic Dry Index (Index) is an indicator of demand for the future market. The Index 
provides insights into the global demand for commodities – grain and wheat for instance, and 
raw materials – iron ore, coal, cement and steel for example. Raw materials are shipped and 
used for infrastructure construction such as highways, railways, buildings, machines, and 
power stations.  
 
 Figure 1. Monthly Baltic Exchange Dry Index from 2005 to 2014 
 Data source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network, as of December 2, 2014 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2005 4,502 4,532 4,678 4,532 3,667 2,746 2,220 2,203 2,803 3,161 2,916 2,600
2006 2,262 2,444 2,599 2,465 2,442 2,718 3,050 3,687 4,039 4,028 4,190 4,336
2007 4,462 4,398 5,123 5,754 6,402 5,772 6,572 7,195 8,586 10,42 10,54 9,854
2008 7,170 6,874 8,063 8,287 10,84 10,24 8,936 7,403 4,975 1,808 819 743
2009 905 1,816 1,958 1,659 2,540 3,823 3,362 2,685 2,351 2,746 3,941 3,572
2010 3,168 2,678 3,207 3,043 3,838 3,088 1,910 2,432 2,719 2,693 2,321 2,031
2011 1,401 1,181 1,493 1,343 1,352 1,433 1,366 1,387 1,840 2,072 1,835 1,869
2012 1,039 703 859 1,021 1,101 937 1,056 761 707 952 1,025 856
2013 771 745 876 874 851 941 1,123 1,088 1,681 1,883 1,559 2,178
2014 1,472 1,140 1,484 1,045 991 912 796 937 1,123 1,101 1,332 1,128
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As is indicated in Figure 1, the Index had a steady monthly increase from 2006 to 2008; 
however, the Index started dropping from the peak of 10,844 in May, 2008 and continued to 
decline to 743 in December 2008. As is well known, the global economy experienced a 
downturn after the financial crisis occurred in 2008. Hence, it happened that the Index 
suffered a sharp decline from 2008 to 2009, and continued to decline to the present level 
except for a moderate rise in 2010 (See Figure 2). The Index remains significantly below the 
ten year historical annual level.  
 
 
Figure 2. Annual Baltic Exchange Dry Index from 2005 to 2014 
Data source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network, as of December 8, 2014 
 
The overall trend was declining from 2010 to 2014 with the BDI dropping from 2,758 to 
1,121, recording a significant decrease of 59.4%. Even though it seemed like a turning point 
occurred in 2013, the BDI remains lower.  The global economy recovers rather slowly after 
the financial crisis, and the European countries are suffering from a debt crisis.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates and benchmarks the monthly Baltic Exchange Dry Index over the past 
three years, offering insights into the recent changes in the global trade market. The monthly 
BDI of 2012 presents evidently seasonal traits, with fluctuations limited to a narrow range.  
Referring to Figure 3, the Index went way up in 2013, as a result of a combination of various 
policies. First, deliveries of new ships decreased sharply, especially in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2013. This created favorable conditions for achieving a more balanced demand-
and-supply dry bulk market. Additionally, seasonal demand in winter helped the market. 
Lastly, throughput of iron ore at major ports in China increased significantly, as did the 
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domestic grain throughput. Both factors contributed to the earnings of Capesize sector and 
hence pulled up the related Baltic Index. Nevertheless, due to a strong market rebound as 
well as a high level of cumulative build up of oversupply in 2013, the market began to shrink 
from the beginning of 2014. As shown in Figure 3, the BDI decreases from 2,178 in 
December 2013 to 1,472 in January 2014. A drop of more than 32 percent happened within a 
short period.  Unlike the trend in the previous year, the market continued to go down in 2014. 
In general, the market appeared better than 2012 even though the BDI recorded only 796 in 
July, which was the first month recording a lowered Index level than that of 2012. In 
subsequent sections, a brief analysis and discussions on the sub-market indices and factors 
that contributed to the current bulk market would be considered.     
 
 
Figure 3. Monthly Baltic Exchange Dry Index from 2012 to 2014 
Data source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network, as of December 2, 2014  
 
The BDI is comprised of four Baltic indices which represent four different sizes of 
oceangoing dry bulk transport vessels as shown in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2012 1,039 703 859 1,021 1,101 937 1,056 761 707 952 1,025 856
2013 771 745 876 874 851 941 1,123 1,088 1,681 1,883 1,559 2,178
2014 1,472 1,140 1,484 1,045 991 912 796 937 1,123 1,101 1,332 1,128
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Table 1. Baltic Indices and Bulk Carrier Market 
Baltic 
Indices 
Ship Types Dead Weight Tons % of World 
Bulk Fleet 
Cargoes 
BCI Capesize 100,000+ 15.8 Iron ore, coal, etc 
BPI Panamax 65,000-100,000 23.8 
Iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite, 
etc 
BSI Supramax 40,000-65,000 30 Grain, coal, steels, cement, 
potash, rice, sugar, salt, etc BHSI Handysize 10,000-40,000 30 
Data source: Clarkson Research Services, Autumn 2014 
 
The Baltic Capesize Index (BCI) is about the cargo movements of Capesize vessels. 
According to the Baltic Exchange, it consists of twelve routes with voyages and trip-charters. 
The Baltic Panamax Index (BPI) is concerned with cargo movements of Panamax vessels of 
60,000 to 99,999 mt dwt and has five routes. The Baltic Supramax Index (BSI) considers 
freight rates for Supramax-type vessel and has routes including nine lanes. The Baltic 
Handysize Index (BHSI) reflects freight rates for Handysize-type vessel of 10,000 to 39,999 
mt dwt covering six trip-charter routes in the Atlantic basin and in the Pacific basin.  
 
The Dry Bulk Market in 2014  
 
 Dry Bulk Market’s Up-and-Down, Mostly Slightly down 
 
From the beginning of the third quarter of 2014, the BDI recorded an increasing level from 
796 in July to 1,123 in September. However, since September 2014, the BDI had a fluctuating 
performance. The BDI decreased slightly in October and then returned to its upward trend 
with an increase of 21% in November (See Figure 4).  
 
China is one of the largest bulk markets in the world, and remains a key driver of the dry bulk 
trade throughout the world. The rebound was stimulated by China‟s demand for iron ore 
which triggered the demand for Capesize vessels, and the BCI saw on the back of a rise from 
1,854 in August to 2,306 in September. As China‟s economy growth rate slowed down in the 
following few months, and the amount of iron ore accumulated, China‟s importation of iron 
ore reduced by 5.3 million tonnes from September to October. As a result, the Index in the 
third and fourth quarters of 2014 was far below the number recorded in the same period of 
2013. Specifically, the BDI was 1,101 in October 2014, which was a decrease of 41.5% 
compared with the level of 1,883 in October of 2013.  Table 2 presents the month-on-month 
change between 2013 and 2014 in every sub-market, from which the growth trends of the 
market can be seen clearly, be it steady, soft, weak, strong, and firm.   
Review of Dry Bulk Shipping Market                                                             Maritime Insight                                                                                                                                      
                                                                       Volume 2, Issue 4, Winter 2014 
    
Page 6 of 40 
 
 
Figure 4. Monthly Baltic Indices of All Bulk Carriers in 2014 
Data source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network, as of December 2, 2014 
 
Table 2. Dry Bulk Market Month-on-Month % Change  
  BCI BPI BSI BHSI 
  2013 2014 Change 2013 2014 Change 2013 2014 Change 2013 2014 Change 
Jan 1,441 2,171 51 719 1,550 116 726 1,156 59 459 723 58 
Feb 1,398 1,674 20 807 1,266 57 692 1,016 47 422 674 60 
Mar 1,275 2,766 117 1,147 1,077 -6 906 1,158 28 505 666 32 
Apr 1,237 1,550 25 1,123 828 -26 904 948 5 534 556 4 
May 1,347 1,490 11 930 950 2 863 889 3 549 494 -10 
Jun 1,637 1,768 8 865 587 -32 907 746 -18 538 455 -15 
Jul 1,986 1,451 -27 1,084 615 -43 914 677 -26 553 379 -31 
Aug 2,069 1,854 -10 941 732 -22 918 860 -6 524 387 -26 
Sep 3,467 2,306 -33 1,335 861 -36 971 1,018 5 554 489 -12 
Oct 3,294 2,085 -37 1,937 993 -49 1,193 948 -21 632 504 -20 
Nov 2,494 3,149 26 1,495 1,123 -25 1,356 911 -33 708 461 -35 
Dec 3,843 1,667 -57 1,921 1,107 -42 1,523 982 -36 801 496 -38 
Data source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network, as of December 2, 2014 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
BDI 1,472 1,140 1,484 1,045 991 912 796 937 1,123 1,101 1,332 1,128
BCI 2,171 1,674 2,766 1,550 1,490 1,768 1,451 1,854 2,306 2,085 3,149 1,667
BPI 1,550 1,266 1,077 828 950 587 615 732 861 993 1,123 1,107
BHSI 723 674 666 556 494 455 379 387 489 504 461 496
BSI 1,156 1,016 1,158 948 889 746 677 860 1,018 948 911 982
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 Capesize Sector Follows the Up-and-Down Trend  
 
The development of China‟s iron ore import demand is likely to remain a key factor in 
influencing the Capesize sector. As indicated in Figure 4, the Capesize market has showed 
notable improvement since the very beginning of Q3, and it even kept a growing trend in the 
first half of Q4. In November, the Capesize sector presented the most favorable market yet, 
and the BCI was able to reach the highest level of the year by surpassing 3,000, rising by a 
surprising 100% in only four months. This may be partly due to the strong growth of iron ore 
production and output by Australia. The increasing supply of iron ore from Australia and 
Brazil has caused the price to go down and thus replaced some of China‟s domestic iron ore, 
which eventually led to the increasing movement of iron ore from Australia to China.   
 
However, due to the convening of the APEC 2014, a lot of manufacturing enterprises 
surrounding Beijing area were informed to suspend operations, causing a build up of 
oversupply in iron ore and coal. Consuming the pre-stored materials might have a negative 
impact on the level of importing and thus place some downside on the Capesize market. As 
shown in Figure 4, the BCI decreased sharply within only one month, going from the highest 
point down to 1,667, resulting in a surprising slump of more than 50%.  
 
In the future, a number of iron ore mine expansion projects in Australia and Brazil will 
further increase the displacement of China‟s domestic iron ore and is expected to lead to 
some moderate upside to the Capesize market. 
 
 Panamax Sector Shows Continued Growth in Q3 & Q4  
 
Growth in China and India‟s coal imports has generally supported the upside of the Panamax 
market, and the seasonal demand in the northern part of China as well as the positive 
influence that the Capesize sector has had made the Panamax market more favorable. 
Additionally, export of grain from the west of America has also boosted the Panamax-type 
freight rate. According to Figure 4, the BPI recorded a strong growth of more than 80% 
within only four months, increasing from 615 in July to 1,123 in November. The strong 
growth trend appeared quite similar to that of the Capesize sector. Indeed, the continuous 
growth in Panamax sector contributed to the overall growth of the average bulk earnings 
while the rest of the vessel-type market was experiencing different levels of volatility.   
 
Later in mid-November, a Free Trade Agreement was signed between Australia and China, 
making Australia exempt from China‟s 3% coking coal import tax, and Australia will be 
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exempt from the 6% tax on steam coal imports within the next two years, according to 
Clarksons Dry Bulk Trade Outlook released in November. The initiative might add some 
further upside to the Panamax sector and reduce the effect caused by China‟s implementation 
of taxes on coal imports. Therefore, even though from October 15, 2014, China began to 
implement a 3% to 6% tax on coal imports, this eventually has not had much immediate 
impact on the Panamax market. Australia is one of China‟s major exporters of coal, and 
owing to the Free Trade Agreement, importing coal from Australia would still pull up the dry 
bulk market. 
 
Elsewhere, the introduction of the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) in Europe is 
expected to limit growth in steam coal imports into the region. However, improvements in 
steel production and blast furnace iron output in Europe is expected to support coking coal 
imports. Imports into other Asian countries are also projected to rise. Overall, the coal trade is 
projected to rise. Despite the potential demand, a build-up of oversupply in the market and 
rapid fleet development are likely to place pressure on earnings in the market in the coming 
years.  
 
  Superamax Sector Climbs in Q3, Falls in Q4 
 
In recent years, there has been significant oversupply in the Handymax market, and 
consequently average trip earnings have remained significantly below the ten year average. 
The market shoed continuous growth in Q3, as the BSI increased from 677 to 1,018. 
Substantial growth in intra-Asian mineral trade supported Handymax demand, particularly 
Indonesian shipments of coal and other minerals to India and China.  
 
However from January 2014, in order to limit some of the initial economic pain, the 
Indonesian government enacted a Mineral Export Ban. Mineral ore exports such as nickel and 
bauxite were banned outright, while exports of so-called mineral concentrate – including 
copper, iron ore, manganese, lead and zinc – will be permitted for the next three years. 
Nevertheless, the export of concentrate will be subject to minimum purity requirements and a 
progressive tax. Copper concentrate, for an instance, will start at 20 percent, rising to 60 
percent of a shipment‟s value by 2016. The ban is expected to have a mixed impact on the 
mine and shipping industry. Everybody involved is in a wait and see phase. As a result, trade 
flows of mines will be redirected, particularly benefiting rival commodity exporters such as 
Australia, the largest producer of bauxite.  
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 Handysize Sector Continues its Slow Growth in Q3 & Q4 
 
After a long period of downturn in the Handysize sector this year, the Handysize market 
finally started to recover this year since the beginning of Q3, although it did record a rather 
slow growth rate. The BHSI, as is shown in Figure 4, started its upward growth from July and 
continued to have a slight growth in Q3. Overall, the Handysize demand is far below the 
historical average and the market still seems weak. Minor bulk trade is the major driver of 
Handysize demand. The trade was hampered by the Indonesian ban on unprocessed mineral 
exports, making 504 to be the highest level of BHSI in Q3 & Q4, as indicated in Figure 4. 
The gap between the highest point and the lowest one within six month was 125, with not 
much vitality compared to all the other bulkcarrier markets. In contrast to the larger 
bulkcarrier sectors, the Handysize fleet has grown by the slowest pace and is projected to 
continue its fairly sluggish growth. The specialised nature of Handysizes and their ability to 
operate on a wider range of routes will continue to support the market.    
 
 Average Bulk Carrier Earnings Record Growth in Q3 & Q4  
 
According to Clarksons Source & Methods Document, earnings are estimated from voyage 
freight rates, and expressed in $/day for the voyage. In broad terms, earnings for each route 
are calculated by taking the total revenue, deducting current bunker costs based on process at 
representative regional bunker ports, estimated ports costs (after currency adjustments) and 
total commission and then dividing the result by the number of voyage days.  
$/day 
 
Figure 5. Monthly Average Bulk Earnings of 2014 
Data source: Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network, as of December 8, 2014 
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Average earnings for each ship type are averages of the voyages earnings for selected routes. 
Average bulk carrier earnings in the bulker market mostly attribute improvements to iron ore 
trade growth in 2014, especially driven by a significant expansion in Australian iron ore 
export to China. The trend line of the Clarksons Average Bulker Earnings indicated in Figure 
5 is very similar with the BDI trend line of 2014. October was exceptional as the BDI 
decreased slightly while average bulk earnings rose. According to Figure 4, this exception 
was due to the increasing demand in the Panamax sector. With all the other sub-market 
indices dropping, the BPI kept rising. This is mainly driven by the coal imports in China, 
India and other Asian countries.   
 
On the other hand, the rapid fleet growth continued to place pressure on earnings of the sector. 
China has released new policies which intend to enforce restrictions on imports in 2015, and 
Europe has adopted environmental policies that may restrict coal imports into the region. 
Further, Indonesian‟s ban on exports of unprocessed minerals has had a negative impact on 
some minor bulk trades in the region. Expansion of the average earnings is projected to grow 
at a slower pace. As a result, expansion of the fleet is expected to slow down in 2015 as well. 
  
The Dry Bulk Market Outlook 
 
The world has changed, and demand growth of dry bulk is less widespread than it used to be. 
There are emerging markets in other regions outside Asia, but this is offset by the gradually 
shrinking base of coal-fired generators in Europe and India. Imports into China have also 
been declining in recent years. Meanwhile, coal demand continues to face challenges. Coal 
demand, to a large extent in our view, is subject to environmental regulation. Another great 
influencer is probably the innovation technology seeking replaceable and high energy 
efficiency substitute for coal.  All of these factors impact coal demand both in the short term 
and in the long run. With more and more countries joining the campaign to reduce carbon 
emissions, many of them have released new regulations concerned with emission control and 
renewable fuels. Currently, China‟s coal sector provides one of the largest markets for mining 
and is responsible for almost half of the total revenue of the industry. Hence, any regulation 
and policy regarding the coal sector of China will serve as a forecast for the dry bulk industry. 
Table 3 summarizes the recent environmental regulations in China and Europe that 
increasingly impacts demand for coal.  
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Table 3. Recent Environmental Regulation and Policies Impacting Demand for Coal       
CHINA 
Regulation, Policy and Possible Impact 
Emission Reduction Targets 
By 2015, emissions of SO2 and NOx are to be reduced relative to 2010 level, and emissions of 
particulate matter by 2017 are to be reduced relative to 2013 level.  
Regional ETS CO2 Emissions Trading 
It was said that seven pilot schemes got under way in 2013-14 as a prelude to a national emissions 
trading scheme to be launched at a future date. 
 
Coal Consumption Caps 
Coal is expected to reduce to less than 65% of total primary energy consumption in some regions for 
the period 2012-17. 
 
Recommencing Import Tariffs on Coal 
In October 2014, the Chinese Government announced its plan to recommence import tariffs on coal. 
 
Continue consolidating Coal Mining Companies 
The government continues to consolidate coal mining companies and plans to reduce its 11,000 coal 
enterprises to 4,000, which will be done through merging large SOEs with SMEs.  
 
Increasing Non-Fossil Fuel Use 
A target has been established to increase non-fossil fuel use to 11.4 percent by 2015, reaching 15 
percent by 2020. 
  
EUROPE 
EU ETS CO2 Emissions Trading 
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) operates in the 28 EU countries and covers around 45% of 
the EU‟s greenhouse gas emissions. In 2020, emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS will be 
21% lower than in 2015. By 2030, the Commission proposes, they would be 43% lower. 
 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) 
The aim of the LCPD is the regulation of emissions to air from large combustion plants. The 
Directive is to set limits on SO2 and NOx emissions, forcing the closure of older coal-fired plants in 
the period to 2015 unless they invest in emission control equipment. 
 
Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) 
The Industrial Emissions Directive sets more stringent rules on SO2 and NOx emissions from  
coal-fired plants than LCPD,covering the period 2016-23. 
 
Emission Performance Standards 
Some countries are considering regulations on CO2 emissions that may prevent the construction of 
new coal-fired plants unless they are fitted with carbon capture. 
 
Source: EPA, EU, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research  
             China‟s 12th Five-Year Plan, European Engineering Industries Association 
             Emissions Trading System, EU Action, Climate Action, European Commission  
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Right Reserved to Reapply the Port Congestion 
Charge 
From announcement, to being prolonged, to reinstatement, and to the right being reserved 
to implementation 
 
Because of the delays, carriers are incurring increased costs associated with container storage, 
labor overtime, and increased trucking charges. Carriers are also spending more on fuel as 
ships are forced to idle off of Los Angeles-Long Beach, then occasionally having to speed up 
to be on time for port calls elsewhere.  
  
Transpacific Stabilization Agreement recommended its members on 14 November 2014 to 
introduce a Port Congestion Charge (The Charge) at US$ 1,000 per 40‟ container and 
US$ 800 per 20‟ container for containers passing through the U.S. West Coast Ports from 17 
November 2014. 13 carriers will assess port congestion fees on cargo shipped on or after 26 
November. The list of carriers includes Mediterranean Shipping Co., CMA CGM, Hanjin 
Shipping, Maersk Line, NYK Line, Zim Integrated Shipping, Hyundai Merchant Marine, 
Evergreen Line, OOCL, APL, Yang Ming, China Shipping and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. Later, on 
November 27, 2014, OOCL decided to indefinitely postpone the imposition of Port 
Congestion Surcharge on all cargo entering the U.S. via U.S. West Coast ports or Canadian 
Gateway ports. Other shipping lines have also postponed the charge. It might be because 
shipping lines worry about the loss of cargoes and customers; in addition, some shipping 
lines are not going to impose the Charge, meaning that the charge is suspended. Furthermore, 
since the introduction of such a charge, various associations and shippers‟ councils have 
challenged the legality of the Charge. FMC is now investigating the composition of the 
charge, and according to the news on JOC on December 1, “carriers first announced the 
charge on November 14, but backtracked days later due to pressure from shippers and 
scrutiny from the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). One by one, however, beginning 
with MSC, carriers announced they would again implement a congestion surcharge on cargo 
heading to the congested West Coast ports where carriers are incurring huge incremental 
costs.”   
 
Some shipping lines withhold the application of the Charge, while others insist on collecting 
it. Shippers should be careful with their choice of shipping lines and give preference to those 
that are not currently collecting the Charge.  Hong Kong exporters selling on CIF/CNF terms, 
and importers buying on Ex-Work or similar terms should be careful as their shipments might 
be subject to the Charge. Shipping lines impose port congestion charge on containers that 
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have arrived or on their way: “ocean carriers” West Coast port congestion surcharges should 
not apply to cargo already in transit.  
 
Table 4. Port congestion surcharges vary by line 
Carrier  20-foot ($) 40-foot ($) 40-foot high cube ($) 45-foot ($) 
MSC 800 1,000 1,125  
CMA CGM 800 1,000 1,100 1,266 
Hanjin 800 1,000 1,125 1,266 
Maersk Line 800 1,000 1,125 1,266 
NYK Line 800 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Zim 1,000 1,000 1,000  
HMM 800 1,000 1,125  
Evergreen Line 800 1,000 1,125 1,266 
OOCL 800 1,000 1,000  
APL 800 1,000 1,125  
Yang Ming 800 1,000 1,125 1,266 
China Shipping 800 1,000 1,125  
MOI 800 1,000 1,125 1,000 
Data source: Journal of Commerce, November 11, 2015  
 
According to The Load Star, November 24, 2014, this may not be the end of the story; 
however, the FMC intends to investigate the cause of the congestion, which has impacted the 
two biggest gateway ports of the U.S. Commissioner Doyle said that, in his view, there were 
three reasons causing congestion at US west coast ports: the use of bigger ships on the trade 
land causing volume surges; the decision by carriers to no longer provide chassis; and the 
bunching of vessels caused by poor schedule integrity.  
 
The crisis of the port congestion charge has just begun. Each party involved needs to be 
concerned about its own interests, although the final good would always be a balanced 
interest among different parties. In a buyers‟ market, shipping lines compete fiercely for 
customers, and hence there is no rationale for shippers to undertaken extra cost during this 
round. Negotiations for better deals between the terminal operator and shipping line 
representatives should be the way out.    
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Frequent Detention Deficiencies Found during 
Ship Inspections, a review of the Tokyo MOU Annual Report 
 
The Tokyo MOU Annual Report introduces the most frequent detainable deficiencies found 
during inspections. By definition, if conditions on board are found not to be in compliance 
with the requirements of the relevant instruments by the port state control officers, ships are 
to be recorded as deficiencies and requested to be rectified. A total of 95,263 deficiencies 
were recorded in 2013, and with their categories shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Deficiencies by categories 
Nature of deficiencies No. of 
deficiencies 
Certificate & Documentation 
Crew Certificates 1,074 
Documents 5,345 
Ship Certificates 2,348 
Structural Conditions 3,511 
Water/Weathertight conditions 5,899 
Emergency Systems 5,392 
Radio Communications 2,500 
Cargo operations including equipment 575 
Fire safety  17,539 
Alarms 754 
Safety of Navigation  16,275 
Life saving appliances 11,507 
Dangerous goods 216 
Propulsion and auxillary machinery 5,458 
Working and Living Conditions 
Living Conditions 620 
Working Conditions 4,887 
Labour Conditions 
Minimum requirements for seafarers 11 
Conditions of employment 33 
Accommodation, recreational facilities, 
food and catering 
199 
Health protection, medical care, social 
security 
66 
Pollution prevention 
Anti Fouling 21 
MARPOL Annex I 2,037 
MARPOL Annex II 40 
MARPOL Annex III 14 
MARPOL Annex IV 1,070 
MARPOL Annex V 2,618 
MARPOL Annex VI 915 
ISM 3,099 
Other 1,240 
Total 95,263 
ISPS 2,033 
Grand total  97,296 
Source: Tokyo MOU Annual Report, 2013 
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The total number of deficiencies has decreased during the past two years. According to the 
Tokyo MOU Annual Report, the number of deficiencies reduced by 5, 067 in number or 5.32% 
in 2013. However, according to Table 5, the number of deficiencies related to Fire Safety, 
Safety of Navigation and Life Saving Appliances amounts to 45,321, a relative large 
proportion of the overall deficiencies. That being said, safety policies and regulations might 
not be fully implemented, even though every single party knows the importance of safety to 
be held in the highest regard. Does this mean vessels are actually sailing safer now? How can 
other interests be ensured if safety navigation is not guaranteed? In the long run, safety is still 
the biggest concern. Furthermore, according to the Annual Report, although deficiencies 
under other categories decreased, deficiencies relating to Working and Living Conditions or 
Labour Conditions and MARPOL Annex V increased notably.  
 
As can be seen in the Annual Report, 16,861 individual ships were involved in the study, with 
31,018 inspections carried out on ships registered under 98 flags. Out of the 31,018 
inspections, there were 18,790 inspections where ships were found with deficiencies. Ships 
are detained under the following conditions. First, the condition of the ship or its crew does 
not substantially correspond with the applicable conventions. By satisfying this condition, the 
ship will be able to sail without presenting a danger to the vessel or persons on board, or 
without presenting an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. In 2013, 1,395 
ships registered under 66 flags were detained because of serious deficiencies found onboard. 
The detention rate of ships inspected was 4.5%. Table 6 shows the 15 flags in the black list 
indicating the worst level of performance.  
 
Table 6. Black list of the Port State Inspection Data 2011-2013 
Flag Inspections 2011-2013 Detentions 2011-2013 
Tanzania 73 18 
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic 593 110 
Papua New Guinea 39 10 
Sierra Leone 764 131 
Cambodia 4,996 767 
Mongolia 408 70 
Indonesia 531 9 
Georgia 42 9 
Tonga 36 8 
Bangladesh 137 18 
Kiribati 614 64 
Saint Kittles and Nevis 126 16 
Thailand 959 86 
Viet Nam 2,290 192 
Belize 1,184 103 
Source: Tokyo MOU Annual Report, 2013 
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Upwards and Downwards of World Port Rankings 
 
Containerisation International has released data about the top 100 ports of 2013; see the top 
20 ports and their throughput change from 2012 to 2013 as indicated in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. The Top 20 Ports of 2012 and 2013 
 
2013 2012 Port Country Region 
2013 annual 
throughput 
2012 annual 
throughput  
Annual % 
Change 
 1 1 Shanghai China China 33,617,000 32,529,000 3.3% 
 2 2 Singapore Singapore Asia 32,240,000 31,260,000 3.1% 
 3 4 Shenzhen China China 23,278,000 22,940,130 1.5% 
 4 3 Hong Kong China China 22,352,000 23,117,000 -3.3% 
 
5 5 Busan 
South 
Korea 
Asia 17,686,099 17,040,567 
3.8% 
 6 6 Ningbo China China 17,351,000 16,175,000 7.3% 
 7 8 Qingdao China China 15,520,000 14,503,000 7.0% 
 8 7 Guangzhou China China 15,309,000 14,763,600 3.7% 
 9 9 Dubai UAE Middle East 13,641,000 13,280,000 2.7% 
 10 10 Tianjin China China 13,010,000 12,303,000 5.7% 
 11 11 Rotterdam Netherlands N Europe 11,621,249 11,865,916 -2.1% 
 12 17 Dalian China China 10,860,000 8,917,000 21.8% 
 13 12 Port Klang Malaysia Asia 10,350,409 10,001,495 3.5% 
 14 13 Kaohsiung Taiwan Asia 9,937,719 9,781,221 1.6% 
 15 14 Hamburg Germany N Europe 9,302,219 8,891,560 4.6% 
 16 15 Antwerp Belgium N Europe 8,578,269 8,635,169 -0.7% 
 17 19 Xiamen China China 8,010,000 7,201,700 11.3% 
 
18 16 Los Angeles US 
North 
America 
7,868,582 8,077,714 -2.6% 
 
19 18 
Tanjung 
Pelepas 
Malaysia Asia 7,627,833 7,718,818 -1.2% 
 
20 22 Long Beach US 
North 
America 
6,730,573 6,045,662 11.3% 
Data source: Containersisation International, Oct 2014  
 
Notably, most of the top 20 ports in 2012 remain in the Top20 Club in 2013. Rankings have 
not changed much, especially among the top 10 ports, except that the Port of Tanjung Priok 
of Indonesia fell to No. 21 and No. 20 was replaced by the port of Long Beach of the U.S. 
with a significant annual throughput growth of 11.3%. China‟s growth slows down, but 
remains above the global average. Four ports record rather impressive annual throughput 
growth - Ningbo, Qingdao, Dalian, and Xiamen. Particularly, the annual throughput of Dalian 
increased at a high rate of 21.8%, far faster than any other ports‟ growth rate. The shipping 
market is constantly changing, as some ports record growth, others show falls. Hong Kong 
faces decreased annual throughput and dropped by 3.3%, thus the No. 3 was officially 
replaced by its neighbor, Shenzhen. Shanghai has retained its position as the world‟s busiest 
container port in 2013, recording a further improvement compared to 2012. 
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Port Operations under Severe Weather Situations 
Ms Judy Tong and Prof. Hong Yan 
Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 
 
ood visibility and steady air flow conditions are two of the most important factors 
for safe transportation operations. In Hong Kong, apart from typhoon signals, delay 
of passenger flight due to adverse weather, such as foggy conditions in January or 
February are well known by the general public, as their travelling schedule to the Chinese 
mainland or nearby Asia countries  could be directly affected. This mainly affects the air side 
of travel.  
 
 
Figure 6. Photo courtesy by South China Morning Post, 05 October, 2013 
 
 
Figure 7a.     Figure 7b. 
Figure 7a and 7b. Quay crane operator’s view to lift container from quay side to vessel deck. 
 
 
G 
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On the other hand, for sea side operations, especially the busy container terminal operations 
(see Figure 6), the situation is not visible to the general public. However, the impact does 
affect the overall port operations efficiency as operations in Hong Kong still rely heavily on 
operator‟s view and experience for safe operations (see Figure 7a and 7b).  
 
This article aims to share the latest port operations challenges under severe weather 
conditions, with the observation that a higher percentage of empty boxes are being re-loaded 
after discharge from previous vessels (see Table 8). In other words, an increased number of 
empty boxes were no longer going through the typical laden discharge, gate-out, empty return 
to terminal cycle. Rather, nearly half of them might be loaded on other vessel(s) after staying 
in the container terminal for several free days. Our previously worldwide throughput Ranked-
No.1 container terminal seems not only to have dropped rankings and be by-passed by the 
Port of Singapore in 2005 and then Shanghai in 2010, but also seems to be gradually moving 
from the role of being a well-known transshipment port to be a regional and largely empty 
container depot as well. The situation gets worse in the five years after 2009. Data also 
indirectly shows that the demand for empty boxes locally is flattening as well (see Table 8 
also). 
 
Table 8. Throughput Statistics of Kwai Tsing Container Terminals  
 
Data Source: Marine Department, HKG SAR. 
 
“Gate” means the entrance point for the transportation company tractors to access the 
container terminal gatehouse (see Figure 8) for box pick up or return from/to the 
corresponding Gate‟s belonging container terminal.  
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In Hong Kong, there are five major container terminal operators (MIT, HIT, CHT, ACT and 
DPI), and they are all located in Kwai Chung container terminal area, with two of them (MTL 
and HIT) operating ancillary terminals in the opposite sea side island, Tsing Yi island where 
separate gatehouse are located for each of the companies. Normally stoppage of empty 
container operations starts first at around the time of typhoon signal no. 3, as the container 
terminal team must start to progressively carry out the lashing work against the container 
stacks, and further, must start with the most dangerous container blocks: the empty ones.  For 
an ideal case, they should be finished well before the signal reach about signal is at no. 8, 
with an ideal time gap of 1 hour before the signal no. 8 is hoisted. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Gatehouse at one of the container terminal in Hong Kong. 
 Photo source: http://www.worldcargonews.com/htm/w20120709.111575.htm 
 
When there are still about 3-4 hours before signal no. 8, all laden container are collected or 
returned by external tractors, meaning the tractors operated by transportation companies, such 
as freight forwarders, will soon be stopped. To general public, there already seems to be a 
total stoppage of container operations. Behind the scenes, if you could view the inside of 
terminal from a nearby high building, you shall be surprised to see a lot of last minute 
internal tractor (meaning tractors operated by the container terminal), equipment, such as 
RTGCs, front-loaders or even Quay Cranes for container lifting to vessel movement, are still 
operating right before typhoon signal no. 8 is hoisted: it is always the intention to finish on-
berth vessel to avoid the need to arrange for the same vessel to be re-berthed after the signal 
has been lowered. However, there might not be such a perfect case and sometimes container 
terminal management might decide to finish all discharge actions first, if the cargo loading 
instructions allow for such choice.  
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This kind of decision comes with two major rationales:  
 
(a) Discharging action is normally faster than loading action, which needs to trace the 
location of the box to be picked up from the container yard.  
(b) Loading boxes (containers) are, by design, well mixed inside the container yard to avoid 
traffic jam during normal loading operation, but this means that it is quite impossible to dig 
them out all before any lashing action to be started block by block, layer by layer in the 
container yard, where lashing action is being done on various spots inside the yard area 
already.  
 
Emergency operation planning under typhoon   
 
Practically, for a given 3 to 4 hours advanced notice by Hong Kong Observatory (HKO) for 
upcoming typhoon signal no. 3, and then normally about 4 to 6 hours ahead to reach signal no. 
8, the chance to remove all loading boxes so as to load on to the on berth vessels, and then 
start the lashing action accordingly, is either unlikely nor can be efficiently carried out. 
However, sometimes there might be the opposite case, especially for small container terminal 
(one or two berths) in order to off-load yard pressure, especially when clearing up any 
suitable empty containers stacks or layers inside the main yard area. Therefore, it all depends 
on the actually yard density situation as well as the on berth vessel cargo loading and 
discharge plan.  
 
From container terminal operation management team point of view, typhoon signal is an 
expected unfavorable factor to deal with, which normally happens during mid summer 
(around the time of May) until early to mid-autumn (around the time of Sep/Oct). A table is 
listed (table 2, TBC) showing times and dates of typhoon signals during the past 10 years. It 
shows that in general, the time gap between signal no. 3 to signal no. 8 is getting shorter 
(from about 8 to 10 hours to 4 to 6 hours now) but typhoon coverage months have increased 
in recent years (from May to September in the past to April to mid-October in recent years).  
Even though the time gap between signal no. 3 to signal no. 8 is shorter in recent years, 
normally reasonable planning is still allowed by the well experienced terminal management 
team to plan ahead. This is due to the fact that the team does not just focus on the signal, but 
more importantly, the wind speed and arrival direction of the typhoon to the city (and the 
port).  
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Planning includes five major areas: 
 
(1) Calculation of the expected un-berth times of all on berth and operating vessels before 
typhoon signal no. 8 is hoisted, and priority assignment, if any.  
(2) Lashing plan generation and its corresponding resources arrangement 
(3) Indoor staff (berth allocation, ship planning, control tower staff) and outdoor staff (yard 
and quay side operators) departure planning and arrangement  
(4) During Typhoon No. 8 (to No. 10 and back to No. 8) stand-by human resources planning 
and arrangement 
(5) Confirmation of the latest target time for the expensive equipment (quay crane, yard 
crane) tie down arrangement (tie down means to lock the equipment on its designated 
container to avoid unexpected structural movement or displacement during the strong 
wind moments 
 
For a mature container terminal, these are always standard procedures and are to be carried 
out under management discretion. From the container terminal management point of view, 
other than typhoon situations which could potentially cause accident/injury, another 
dangerous situation could be the sudden extreme strong wind arrival or sudden heavy 
rainstorm situation. In Hong Kong, up to this moment, most of the daily container lifting 
movements are controlled by crane operator‟s bare eye, especially vertical moments along the 
shore sides and inside the container yard. Operations under unclear visibility and/or 
unexpected strong wind condition could cause container damage or accident, and also might 
result in potential cargoes claims and life threatening to surrounding shore side and on deck 
workers or crew.  
 
Unfortunately, sudden heavy rain normally comes with strong wind and lightning. Fallen 
containers by sudden strong wind means precaution plans, such as container lashing block by 
block are all but impossible to be carried out unlike in typhoon periods where there are at 
least 6 to 8 advanced preparation hours. The only possible means is to broadcast evacuation 
instructions. However, the instructions do not guarantee all the in yard active tractors could 
be arranged to a safe location.  
 
Operations hours Loss 
 
Prolonged strong wind could further suspend all yard operations for at least half an hour or 
more where containers are stacked up, up to 6 container high (for typically RTGCs operating 
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yard area) and 12 container high (for Electronic Yard Crane operating yard area) respectively. 
The official name of such situation is called “Gust Wind”. Other than local wind gauge 
installed on the top of various Quay Cranes (the highest point inside the container terminal), 
container operators have installed advanced alarm computer systems supported by the Hong 
Kong Observatory (HKO), and such a system could allow about 15 minutes advanced notice 
before the gust wind arrives to Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi container terminal area. Depending 
on the wind direction, containers might be blown to shift position or even fall down along the 
wind line. Normally empty containers are the most dangerous ones due to their lighter weight 
and by design, they are not supposed to be put inside the active RTGC yard area. For each 
container terminal, there must be a designated empty container yard area, where stacking up 
of containers could be up to 8 high, depending on the heaving height limit of the severing 
equipment, called front loader.  
 
Rainstorm Warning System 
 
 
Figure 9. The evolution of various weather warning signals in Hong Kong 
 Photo courtesy by Hong Kong Observatory (HKO). 
 
Since the setting up of black, red and amber rainstorm warning system in 1992 in Hong Kong 
(see Figure 9), there have been on average about 2-3 black cloud signal hoisted per year (See 
Figure 9a and 9b as sample). On 2014 March 30th, a black rainstorm warning signal even 
comes with the rarely found ice balls falling: they were sized about 20 to 30 mm diameter 
(the official scientific name of such phenomena is “haul reports”). This gives further 
challenge to Port Operations as many workers are under an outside working environment, and 
the overall operations planning during severe weather situations. The container management 
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team needs to think bigger and wider for all possible risks and hazards during the bad weather 
moments, instead of operation suspension only. 
 
 
 
Figure 9a and Figure 9b show a typical weather report by the Hong Kong Observatory (HKO) 
during Summer Time of Hong Kong, with four special warning signals issued on 11 May 
2014 late evening, changing from Amber to Red Warning Signal with a few hours: 
(a) Amber Rainstorm Warning Signal ( ), 
(b) Amber Rainstorm Warning Signal (  ),  
(c) Special Announcement on Flooding in Northern New Territories (  ),  
(d) Landslip Warning (  ) and  
(e) Thunderstorm Warning (     ).  
 
Up to this moment, there is neither specific guideline nor rules/regulation set up by the 
Government bodies with the industry and announced to the outdoor workers or equipment 
operators during black or red storm signal. Container damage cases during the bad weather 
situation are normally regarded as normal damage cases, without specific definition for the 
sole responsibility. This might be a potential area for the government to consider and strike a 
good balance with the container terminal operators in order to increase the life protection for 
the industry without affecting the terminal efficiency too much. 
 
Figure 9a     Figure 9b 
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Foggy seasons 
 
Another less impacting weather factor is the foggy conditions (Figure 10). It could block 
visibility for a prolonged period of time (over 2-3 hours) but they are not avoidable. To avoid 
haul damage or accidents during vessel loading or discharge action, normally quay crane 
operations shall stop until the foggy level gets clearer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is regarded as less dangerous factor, and normally stoppage of loading or discharge 
operations along the quay side over a few hours is adequate. There is less worry of container 
falling cases as compared to other extreme weather signal. However, from the individual 
vessel operation point of view, the stoppage time of 2-3 hours, could be 20% or even 30% of 
the berthing hours. Nowadays, normally vessels berth for at most 10 to 12 hours, except 
during special cargo loading, such as with yachts or category 1 cargo operations. For 
Category 1 Cargoes
*1
, such as explosives, according to the rule of Hong Kong (and many 
other places), they could only be transported via water transport means, such as barge, and no 
stoppage is allowed once it is discharged from the barge and has moved all the way to the 
second leg loading vessel. Other than these special cases plus some rare exceptional cases, 
                                                        
1
 Data source: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Cargoes/Pages/DangerousGoods.aspx 
 
 
Figure 10. Container terminal quay side operations suspension under heavy fog layers 
Photo source: http://www.panoramio.com/photo/78361632 
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berthing hours normally last for 8 to 10 hours only. Therefore, stoppage of 2-3 hours is 
already quite a serious delay to the on berth vessel and also for upcoming awaiting vessels to 
arrive. 
 
Summary 
 
We could see a lot of changes ahead faced by the container terminal operators to upkeep the 
productivity with the increased volume of empty boxes handling during severe weather 
conditions in recent years. The adverse weather seasons, covering the traditional shipping 
peak seasons from May to September in each year, could dramatically affect the Port 
Operations and result in vessel berthing congestion problems which need at least a week to 
reach a full recovery for normal operations. 
 
The higher percentage of empty container inbound or pass thru (transshipment containers) to 
Hong Kong add further challenges to the operation management team as the boxes might be 
put in ad hoc areas inside the yard, which could potentially increase the chance to container 
fallen case during the strong winds or adverse weather conditions. We also see that before the 
creation of various adverse weather conditions (e.g. the black rainstorm warning signal) by 
the Government, it was more or less the port operator‟s sole decision on operations 
suspension during extreme weather hours. After they are implemented, the decision 
mechanism is still similar to the past. We hope the throughput of Hong Kong is maintained 
for its volume and growth, but the actual increasing percentage of empty loading container 
against empty discharge container could gradually shape the port of Hong Kong as a regional 
on-dock depot.  
 
Without proactive improvement measures to attract more laden boxes transshipped via Hong 
Kong as in the past, this empty box flux shall definitely affect the competitiveness of the Port 
of Hong Kong in the long run, and in the not very far future, the Port will be worsened by the 
adverse weather seasons during the peak seasons in the summer and early autumn. 
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Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Capt Pappu Sastry 
Managing Director of NEPA Projects & Investments Limited 
Hong Kong 
 
Corporate governance and risk management are discussed in this article with respect to the 
shipping industry and from the perspective of a ship captain, who has started and is running a 
shipping company in Hong Kong through the highs and lows, whilst evolving and 
diversifying into various other businesses related to shipping.  
 
Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance, in shipping terms, is running a shipping company in such a way to 
make it successful, whilst it is also expected to follow norms and at the same time be unique 
in its own way. There are many textbooks and lectures on how to be a CEO or Managing 
Director and how to govern “A” company, although nothing really specific to shipping. That 
said, there are so many varied types of shipping companies and so many factors that affect a 
truly international business such as shipping, that very little can be taught in class rooms or 
books and a lot of it has to be learnt through experience. Whether it is small and diverse or 
large and focused, contrary to popular belief, the challenge of corporate governance or rather 
running a company is always the same.  
 
There are many fallen great leaders and many “indispensable” people in the graveyards. 
Some say it is the team that makes the company whilst others say it is the leader; it is 
probably a combination of the two. For me, it is the team that can execute the thought process 
of a leader, a team like the one at Apple or Google. Since there are many variables in a team, 
it then becomes the responsibility of the leader to ensure the team understands the thought 
process.  
 
I had started a shipping company in 2007 and for the initial years I worked alone because I 
had difficulty in sharing, being a team player, finding others as efficient as me, and possibly 
surviving was more important than expansion. Even then I was governing myself well, using 
my wife as a part time secretary and still had a lot of projects in hand and in the pipeline that 
I could manage and sustain due to level headed business partners. I took pride in knowing 
each and everything that is going on in the company but that also meant that the growth had a 
horizon beyond which I could not reach as a single person, but  had to develop a team that 
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can work like me or even better, to  be a force multiplier. It was only in 2010 when I was at a 
crossroads of sorts that I was made to realize, in a corporate management school, that 
companies are more than just one person or leader and larger success cannot come without a 
team. In the past four years, the company has thus grown and diversified to be known widely 
as the innovative small company that loves to struggle, but finally does find a foot in a 
different arena every year. 
 
The success of many companies comes from team leaders hiring or partnering with people 
who share the passion, and dare to be different, but also have different skill sets and can do 
that part as good as the leader or better. As you grow, it also becomes necessary that you have 
a tier of people in the company who have the fire in their belly to work harder than you to 
ensure they have a better career in the long run. I am no corporate governance guru but from 
experience and discussions with friends in the industry, I know that you have to identify the 
“employer” material and the “employee” material, and you need an appropriate number of the 
two categories working for any company. The employer material will have the vision whilst 
employee material is the executer of such a vision. 
 
From being out at sea and living in a society of 25 persons on a ship for a major part of 14 
years of in my youth, and from being captain of several ships with different challenges, I had 
learnt a great deal but had never come across corporate governance. On a ship there was 
hierarchy and everyone was put onboard with a known set of skills and knowledge that was 
certified by a competent authority. So, every time a team member changed, as often as once a 
month, there was ready acceptance of the company‟s decision to place that new person 
onboard that ship in that position. In an office, it is completely different from a ship. Whilst 
hierarchy is respected to some extent, even if I insist otherwise, the acceptance of a new team 
member is more difficult mainly because the decision to place a person in a particular 
position is taken by someone within the office. Moreover, office personnel do not change 
regularly and so acceptance of a person into the team is slower but once done it is also 
stronger. In fact, almost all staff in various teams in our company are doing the work that they 
have not done in their previous jobs and some of them are completely new to shipping. This 
approach ensures that the corporate culture of the company stays indigenous, whilst we 
embrace the corporate cultures of other industries as well as learn from a fresh thought 
process of doing the required activity, but the employees and employers do not carry baggage 
from previous posts. 
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Corporate governance is about man-management as much as it is the management of 
businesses. It is also more about doing it right, not necessarily perfectly and living with 
mediocrity and realizing the potential of a person who may not shine where assigned but may 
do well unexpectedly elsewhere. A healthy office environment where everyone is aligned in 
their thought process of what they expect from a business is what a successful business would 
be. Besides, letting people have the pleasure of making their own mistakes and learning from 
them and getting them to crave for new horizons, has only benefited the company till date. So 
it seems like a formula that can work until it is proven wrong in time. 
 
Risk Management 
 
Risk Management, by definition, is 
the management of the risk in order 
to place sufficient safeguards in 
place to try and find a way to do the 
activity that you intend. Even in the 
MBA curriculum, Risk Management 
teaches you to identify the risk and 
manage it in a way that the activity 
becomes safer for the individuals or 
the environment, but ultimately for 
the company who is managing the 
activity. Risk management is my 
favorite subject in shipping, whilst 
many of my friends find it somehow 
to be a „necessary evil‟ of the 
corporate world that has crept into 
shipping only in the last 2 decades. 
Being the second oldest profession 
in the world, sailing on ships has 
always been considered more of an 
adventure than a profession.  
 
However I can guarantee you that it has changed more in recent years than for ages before 
that, although necessarily for the better with more procedures, and for the worse with people 
perceived to be made of lesser grit. Like every other industry, shipping is also over regulated 
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and almost every large company seems to be run by their “Risk” team, rather than their top 
management who know how to run the business. Most notable corporations have self-
imposed rules for everyone including board of directors in a company wherein the „risk‟ team 
is supposed to set the standards of what can be done, and what cannot be done.  
 
One good example of risk management working well with shipping in recent times is the 
trading of vessels to piracy areas off the Horn of Africa. There was a situation where the 
piracy in the Indian Ocean was increasing and whatever area was being drawn was being 
extended after finding attacks could be executed well away from the Somalia coastline. There 
were regulations in place for not having naval vessels shoot at suspicious boats in 
international waters. There were many hindrances to safe passage but the formula was 
required for commercial shipping to work and slowly it was put in place with extra security 
measures, armed guards, naval convoys, designation corridors for passage in Indian ocean to 
enter Gulf of Aden, separate insurance for kidnapped crew of ships, and more than everything 
else implementation of procedures of awareness onboard ships and within the shipping 
community. Everyone tends to hear only when a lot of noise is made, and enough was made 
to ensure that the required was done. Irrespective, there are some larger companies who could 
never adapt, and there were the few who did not want to manage the risk, and believed the 
only way to manage the risk is to avoid it. 
 
I believe a good example of the risk management going wrong in shipping is the way it is 
blindly believed that a paper can solve an actual problem. If the original Bills of Lading are 
not available at discharge port, the cargo is discharged against LOI (Letter of Indemnity). If a 
superintendent goes on a ship for pre-purchase inspection, he is allowed onboard after signing 
a LOI. If a master is asked to discharge a cargo of wheat in rain, he will do it if you give him 
a LOI. The LOI is somehow an accepted “tick box” for some kinds of risk taken by the ship 
or the ship owner or the acceptor, who possibly knows that they want to do it commercially 
but do not know a better way of managing the risk. Even though all P&I clubs insist that any 
act that is done against a LOI is not insured, the clubs themselves have also come to a stage 
where they accept that everyone somehow asks for it and gets it and so they even came up 
with recommended formats for LOI for particular instances. Some people go one step further 
and say they will accept a LOI if a bank were to endorse it. LOI is not worth the paper it is 
written on and any amount of endorsements will not make you a prudent acceptor of the risk.  
This only proves that such risk management is frivolous and is being bent for the commercial 
world; then the question is, what else can you bend as a practice for the commercial world? 
The matter of LOI in commercial world is considered calculated risk that is acceptable and is 
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a consistent term in Charter Parties of all sorts and whether it is banking procedures dictating 
the terms or duration of voyage, the fact remains that there are very few cases when original 
bills are available in the fast turnaround shipping world of today and thus the LOI acceptance 
is considered a norm. Some parts of the Shipping industry adopted  paperless trading and 
many such ship masters never see or know the importance of the Bills of Lading anymore. 
However, extending this practice towards a habit, such as getting a LOI to cover discharge of 
wheat in rain, when for example, we know the paper will not prevent the wheat from getting 
wet. This is where the purpose of risk management is totally misunderstood. 
 
That being said, there are still many rookies in shipping who are actually not regulated or 
rather the regulations are optional for some critical parts of shipping. They invariably lower 
the standards and then a new regulation comes in due to such rookies and thereafter the 
already over-regulated large firms embrace more stringent rules for themselves to make it as 
difficult as possible for the rest of the teams in the company to be able to work in the manner 
they used to work. If properly executed, risk management is a great tool for anyone to 
understand where the risk lies and then gives a chance for any person to do something about 
it. Risk management plays a part in every day activity onboard a ship and ISM and other 
regulations have ensured that the shipboard practices are safer than before. For reasons 
outlined earlier, possibly enforcing a regulation or a method of doing things is easier onboard 
a ship than in an office environment. Corporate shipping, when evolved into larger firms, 
starts getting more corporate and less like shipping.  
 
Talking of rookies in shipping, there are in general four main parties to a voyage that is 
considered a “maritime adventure”: Ship Owner, Ship Manager, Ship Master and the 
Charterer (and/or cargo owners). Almost all the regulations in shipping are somehow the 
burden of the Ship Manager and Ship Master. The Ship Owners could well be an offshore 
company with very little shipping knowledge which is not earning enough to sustain itself 
and thus is unable to pay the Managers and Shipboard staff on time; there are very few 
safeguards against that in way of risk management, but the regulations requiring you to 
maintain all standards are exactly the same as any other ship that is well maintained because 
the Owners are able to afford that. Ship Managers do a lot of risk evaluation  as required by 
regulations to safeguard against any ill repute or incident that can affect the Ship or the 
Company, but they do little risk evaluation of larger companies that are long term clients who 
are now suffering and unable to pay their bills.  
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Similarly many Charterers are completely unregulated unless they would voluntarily submit 
to these. When they charter a ship from a ship owner, the due diligence is always considered 
the prerogative of the Ship owners to check if Charterers will perform if the Voyage is fixed. 
Charterers find comfort in the fact that there is no risk (no such thing) with a ship owner who 
anyway has a ship as asset and so will perform his part of the venture. It has happened so 
many times that the Charterers had to pay to complete voyages that ship owners abandoned 
due to their heavily mortgaged assets or operational issues or losses elsewhere in the business. 
So, it becomes abundantly clear that risk management for many is selective and not a way of 
life. 
 
Co-relationship between Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
 
Whilst many consider risk 
management necessary, why 
does it have to be termed evil? 
There is a good reason why 
corporate governance and risk 
management are co-related 
topics. The matter of risk 
management has caught up so 
much with corporate world 
that the management or team 
leaders think that they cannot 
follow their will without the 
risk team clearing their intended actions; it is designed to be good and evil irrespective of 
whichever side you are looking at it from. The corollary that follows is: if the management is 
always insistent or has made up its mind to do a business or a trade or an activity, they tend to 
put pressure on the risk team to look at the risk more “practically” or sometimes totally turn a 
blind eye to it. That possibly is the reason for downfall of a lot of small and large companies.  
 
The mistake, in my view, is having the legal team become your risk team.  The risk team will 
have to understand the business better than the regulation so that they can apply the 
regulation to the practicality of the business, not the other way around. It also is difficult then 
understand the practicality of most regulations that are made by people who are not hands-on 
with the industry‟s evolution. In most cases, the management using advisors on new 
regulations and doing their own risk management seems to be a way of getting it right more 
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often than others. This is because the management will have the right idea of practicality and 
the commercial pressures associated with the cost and benefit of managing a risk to a 
particular extent. 
 
As a person who is learning corporate governance slowly from scratch, I have realized there 
is always one statement that is applicable uniformly to all companies: “Status Quo is not an 
option”; so every company evolves, changes, tries, fails and succeeds at different stages of its 
life, only because they have to try something new. Every business is a risk whether small or 
big and every deal is a gamble whether risk is managed or otherwise. Risk management is not 
about calling the odds in Macau but it is as simple or complicated as disciplining the already 
educated and seasoned gambler. 
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Abstract 
 
To date 80% of the global trade (by volume) is transported by sea, although we have yet to 
arrive at a consensus on the appointment of a global, regional or local constabulary. Nor is 
there a designated prosecuting authority to secure the maritime commons. This is not only an 
issue of resources and competency but also of mutual trust, acceptability, reliability, 
sustainability and motivation. Assuming that the biblical principle of the strong protects the 
weak is still valid, it naturally then becomes the responsibility of the three strongest nations 
today namely China, India and the United States to jointly accept this responsibility.  
 
As such, most stakeholders opine that, it becomes pragmatic for all the three countries to 
share the responsibilities of securing the maritime commons, particularly in Asia which the 
US (mainly) has been discharging (not very successfully and rather thanklessly) since the end 
of Second World War. It will necessarily mean clear identification and acceptance of the 
consensually developed common objectives as well as enumerating and highlighting the areas 
of disagreements in order to enhance cooperation while trying to simultaneously deter 
occurrence of conflicts in this region. The next step would be endeavoring to develop a short 
term as well as long term strategy and finally preparing a roadmap to implement it. 
 
Several analysts who were interviewed have advised that there are several such important 
issues demanding attention and they should be prioritized, with the top one being to draw a 
roadmap for developing a tri-lateral mutually beneficial relationship.  This paper attempts to 
explore this aspect by highlighting areas of cooperation as well as those of conflict and 
suggesting ways and means to enhance one while degrading the other. 
 
Keywords: Capacity Building, Maritime Commons, Policing and Strategy. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Presently the Indian Ocean is viewed as a more “active” ocean than the Atlantic and Pacific 
as it is hosting a spectrum of activities ranging from extensive trade, transportation to 
important energy transfers which are quantitative as well as qualitatively much larger in 
scope and size than that can be found in the other two oceans. Given that nearly 100,000 
ships transit the expanse of the Indian Ocean annually it is a very trade busy ocean.  It is 
perhaps the only ocean through which SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) reach out to the 
entire world, be it those originating from the Persian Gulf with oil and gas laden ships, or 
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those with other cargo or commodities from the littorals as well as transiting ships from the 
Far East. Significantly, some of the world‟s most important choke points and narrow passages 
provide access to the Indian Ocean, and these can have associated vulnerabilities. 
 
As such, the current accent on increasing globalization in the economic field has for the 
littorals brought attendant maritime security concerns to the fore. Thus, with a rising 
trajectory of sea borne trade which compliments this ascent, there seems to be a 
corresponding increase in asymmetric threats (Brewster, 2010). Incidents of maritime 
transnational crime like modern piracy, terrorism and drug running in their ever evolving 
manifestations have emerged as the bane of the sea farer. As these maritime security 
challenges are essentially asymmetric in nature there have been strident calls for effective law 
enforcement and maintenance of maritime order by all stakeholders (IMB, 2012). 
 
This growing salience of sea borne trade, and the attendant rise in transnational threats in the 
region has also led to the adoption of enhanced cooperative approaches between navies of 
various Indian ocean littoral countries in the form of numerous anti-piracy patrols which 
operate in the area that have resulted in the eventual decrease in the number of piracy attacks. 
But the challenge remains as attacks continue to take place in further ranges due to the usage 
of sophisticated technologies by pirates and other non-state actors.  
 
To the old idea of collective security were added concepts of common, comprehensive and 
cooperative security. Confusion was bound to follow as the term is used to describe different 
things or conditions in a different context. The question is less one of what, exactly, is 
security? Rather, it is perhaps better phrased as what are the different ways in which to 
conceive of security? And what are the implications for policy? Because most theorizing 
about security has not been maritime focused, it is essential to place the development of 
concepts of maritime security within the context of the wider security debate.  
 
However, despite the strategic divergence and competitiveness on many issues in the region, 
both India and China are increasingly keen to assume the responsibilities of global policing of 
maritime commons which the US so far, has been discharging after the exit of the British 
from the region in the late sixties (Ehrhart, 2013). Given that the maritime capacities of most 
of the other littorals are inadequate, it has become incumbent on India, China and the US 
along with other capable maritime nations to don this mantle. This will necessarily mean 
clearly identifying and stating the common objectives as well as enumerating the areas of 
disagreements. The next step would be endeavoring to develop a short term as well as long 
term strategy and finally preparing a roadmap to implement it.  
 
Such a strategy will necessarily have to look beyond narrow national maritime boundaries 
towards the security of the global maritime commons. With the US maritime powers in 
decline (perceived or real), maritime disputes on the rise, and international maritime law 
being increasingly tested, the world can no longer take the security and openness of the 
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maritime commons as a given (Isenberg, 2013).  
 
While on one hand there are maritime nations like India and China that have the capacity to 
assist in sea governance, it must be remembered that it is of utmost importance to “carry 
along” other littorals in such an effort. Thus multinational forums in the region come to the 
fore as they have an important role to play in this regards. Maritime initiatives like Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) (started by India) and those like IORA (Indian Ocean Rim 
Association) can also be used for cooperation for overcoming issues related to maritime 
security threats thus assisting in maintaining good order at sea and in sea governance.   
Similarly, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) the ADMM Plus and its associated agencies 
(e.g. like the ASEAN Maritime Forum) provide institutions which encourage cooperation. 
However, one of the prime lacunae has been intra governmental cooperation, which needs to 
be addressed first before looking across the boundaries.  
 
2.  Altered Global Environment and Global Commons  
 
These geo-political changes are reshaping the nature of the maritime commons. The global 
shift in maritime power thus harbors a strong potential for conflict and confrontation between 
regional powers and could slip out of control if caution is not exercised. The main reason for 
this scenario is the global diffusion of maritime power as a result of the “rise of the rest”, 
which is above all, changing the geostrategic maritime balance. It will result in enabling the 
new entrants to project power beyond their territorial waters. Inevitably neighboring countries 
will respond by strengthening their own (EU Parliament Study, 2012) 
 
The deep linkages of maritime terrorism and  of "container security" were only realized after 
it was reported  in January 2002  that the search of a vessel by US naval forces nearly yielded 
a group of Al Qaeda terrorists who had been hiding inside a well-equipped shipping container 
(Sakhuja, 2013). A dramatic increase in containerized cargo and inadequate infrastructure to 
check all sealed containers led to the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the requirement 
to make ports ISPS compliant, but a robust fool proof method against such security lapses has 
yet to be arrived at.  
 
The other primary concern is that of rising maritime terrorism. In the years to come maritime 
terrorism is likely to manifest and evolve itself in many unique ways (Germond, 2011). The 
use of the seas as a supply chain link for a terror attacks on land based targets is likely to be 
the chosen methodology of terror outfits. While the seas ensure the easy passage of men and 
material for the attack, the land provides them with the publicity and number of victims 
unavailable at sea. Hence the constabulary functions of maritime agencies are likely to see an 
enhancement with the growing demand for a fool proof coastal security systems.  
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3.  Conclusion 
 
Maritime challenges and threats in the Indo Pacific region have been on the rise in recent 
years and have the potential to create serious impediments to the concept of freedom of the 
seas thus affecting sea borne trade in the region. Additionally, these threats have also 
spawned a multitude of 'out of area operations‟ which has entailed additional roles for the 
littoral navies. Countering these threats and challenges requires cooperation and sensitivity to 
security concerns of other countries, an aspect that is difficult to achieve with the level of 
existing trust between states. The US, an Indo Pacific power along with  India,  and  China,  
are the primary maritime nations that  have a responsibility to  help  other littoral states 
towards capacity building and ultimately towards maintenance of "maritime good order" in 
the region.   
 
In this context it is necessary that a matrix of cooperation be evolved which would enhance 
“maritime bonding” at various levels between the maritime agencies and the navies.  This 
cooperative approach would also serve as de facto confidence building measure between the 
three countries. This has been evidenced by the current cooperative efforts in combating 
Somalian piracy singly, bilaterally and multi-laterally in the Horn of Africa. 
 
Such measures and methods would not only help in overcoming the challenges and threats in 
the oceanic dimension but ensure the freedom of navigation for the trade flows. After all, the 
sea is unique in bringing together maritime minded countries which in turn enlarges the 
brotherhood of the seas. 
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